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Abstract 
 
We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple 
tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions 
by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) that 
restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes 
and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the 
resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of 
incentive wage schemes. We also extend the results of the single-agent model to the 
multi-agent model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the adverse selection problem in which a principal hires a 
single agent and delegates different tasks to him; these tasks are assumed to be 
independent of each other and homogeneous. The hired agent observes the private 
signals relevant to his respective tasks; however, the principal cannot observe these 
signals. Therefore, the principal will attempt to incentivize the agent to announce his 
true private signals by designing a well-behaved mechanism or a contract.   
The standard approach in the informational economics literature is that the 
principal is sufficient to design an individual wage scheme for each task since each task 
is independent and identical. The scheme bases a wage payment on the agent’s 
announcement. However, this approach has the following drawback. If the lower bound 
of the wage payment such as non-negativity exists, each agent can earn a positive 
information rent and the principal fails to extract the full surplus in a non-negligible 
manner. 
This paper presents an alternative approach to solve the adverse selection problem 
and suggests a means to overcome the above mentioned drawback. By using a whole 
incentive scheme, which depends on all independent tasks, the principal is not required 
to design an inconstant wage scheme and succeeds in extracting the full surplus without 
suffering any non-negligible welfare distortion. More precisely, this paper will show 
that when the number of tasks is sufficiently large, a social choice function is virtually 
implementable by the whole incentive scheme without side payments if and only if such 
a function is exactly implementable by the individual wage scheme with unbounded 
side payment. Thus, the class of implementable social choice functions is almost the 
same in both cases. 
In order to prove this, we apply the concept of a linking mechanism as a whole 
incentive scheme, which was proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007). As in the 
case of the standard direct mechanism, the principal requires the agent to make an 
announcement for each task about the observed private signal. The main difference 
between the linking mechanism and the direct mechanism is that the principal restricts 
the message space in advance by directing the agent to ensure that the proportion of the 
tasks for which the agent announces a private signal is approximately equal to the   3
probability of this signal being observed for a single task. Since the total number of the 
tasks is sufficiently large, it is almost certain, based on the law of large numbers, that 
the realized proportion of the tasks for which each private signal is observed is almost 
the same as the probability of this signal being observed for a single task. Therefore, 
truth-telling, which induces the value of the social choice function for all tasks, is 
almost compatible with this message space restriction. 
The essential finding of this paper is the clear resemblance between the functioning 
of this message space restriction and that of the incentive wage schemes in the standard 
approach. This resemblance can be elucidated using the following case in which the 
principal designs the wage schemes for the agent in order to incentivize him to tell the 
truth. Let us suppose that the agent adopts a dishonest strategy that causes the frequency 
of announcing each signal to be different from the probability of this signal being 
observed. In such a case, a well-designed wage scheme can detect this dishonesty and 
the agent will be fined a large expected amount. In this sense, the functioning of the 
incentive wage scheme parallels that of message space restriction. On the other hand, if 
the agent adopts a dishonest strategy that causes the frequency of announcing each 
signal to be equal to the probability of this signal being observed, no wage scheme will 
detect this dishonesty. Therefore, we merely need to examine whether, in the absence of 
an incentive device, the agent has an incentive to adopt a dishonest strategy that causes 
the frequency of announcing each signal to be equal to the probability of this signal 
being observed. This implies that the necessary and sufficient condition for 
implementability is generally the same for both the individual wage scheme case with 
wage payment devices and the whole incentive case with no such devices. Therefore, 
we can conclude that applying a linking mechanism is far more advantageous than 
designing an incentive wage scheme; this is because a linking mechanism enables us to 
avoid positive information rents and welfare distortions without narrowing the class of 
implementable social choice functions. 
We can extend our arguments to the case of multiple agents who are in conflict 
with each other. Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) showed that the linking mechanism 
functions effectively with private values, and independent signals across the agents if 
the social choice function satisfies the ex ante efficiency. Contrary to Jackson and 
Sonnenschein (2007), we consider more general environment, where we do not require   4
the private values assumption. In the general environment, we characterize the class of 
social choice functions that are virtually implemented by the linking mechanisms if we 
consider  weak implementation with  -Nash equilibrium.
1  We also present an 
alternative sufficient condition, i.e., supermodularity, and also investigate the correlated 
signals case. 
In the economics theory literature, we find that some papers have presented 
concepts related to linking mechanisms before the study by Jackson and Sonnenschein 
(2007). For instance, bundling goods by a monopolist (Armstrong (1999)), storable 
votes (Casella (2005) and Casella, Gelman, and Palfrey (2006)), and multimarket 
contact (Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Matsushima (2001)). For more recent 
studies, see Eliaz, Ray, and Razin (2007) and Fang and Norman (2003, 2006). It is 
important to conduct laboratory experiments to show whether the linking mechanism 
functions effectively and the extent to what it does so. As Fehr and Falk (2002), Fehr 
and Gächter (2002), and Fehr, Gächter, and Kirschsteiger (1997) have shown through 
laboratory experiments, the incentive device of monetary rewards and punishments 
results in a decline in the reciprocal motives of real individuals. We conjecture that the 
incentive device of a linking mechanism is more compatible with this reciprocal motive 
than is that of monetary rewards and punishments.
2 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the single agent model. 
Section 3 presents the necessary condition for the virtual implementation of a social 
choice function. Section 4 introduces the linking mechanism and characterizes the class 
of social choice functions that it virtually implements. Section 5 characterizes the class 
of the social choice functions that are exactly implemented by inconstant wage schemes 
and shows the resemblance between the functioning of incentive wage schemes and that 
of the linking mechanism. Section 6 extends our results to the case of multiple agents. 
 
                                                 
1  Note that Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) consider a sufficient condition for full implementation 
with Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense that all exact equilibria secure the efficiency. For 
characterization of virtual implementation in more general environment, we relax the notion of 
equilibrium and focus one equilibrium even if there are multiple equilibria. 
 
2 Engelmann and Grimm (2008) presents experimental research on linking mechanisms. They 
reported that linking mechanisms function effectively in laboratories. Moreover, the experiments 
conducted by Casella, Gelman, and Palfrey (2006) on storable votes closely related to linking 
mechanisms reported that the storable votes performed very well.   5
2. The Model 
 
We investigate the following situation in which a principal delegates  K  distinct 
tasks to a single agent, i.e., the agent is required to choose a profile of  K  alternatives 
11 1 ( ,..., ) ( )
KK
K kk k k aa a A    , where for each  {1,..., } kK  ,  k A   denotes the finite set of 
alternatives for the k-th task, and  kk aA  . The agent observes a profile of  K  private 
signals  11 1 ( ,..., ) ( )
KK
K kk k k       , where  k   denotes the finite set of private 
signals for the k-th task, and  kk   . This paper focuses on symmetric models in that 
k AA   and  k    for all  {1,..., } kK  . Let  I     . For each  {1,..., } kK  , 
the agent observes a private signal  k   for the k-th task with positive probability 
()0 k p   , where the private signals are independently drawn according to the 
probability function  : (0,1] p  . 
The principal is unaware of the profile of private signals and therefore requires the 
agent to announce a message on the basis of the mechanism given by 
()( , (, ) ) KM g t   . Here, M   is the finite set of messages for the agent, 
()
K gM A   ,
3 and  : tM R  . When the agent announces a message  mM  , the 
principal compels him to choose any profile of alternatives  1 ( ,..., )
K
K aa A   with 
probability  1 ( )( ,..., ) K gm a a
4 ; the principal himself chooses the side payment 
() tt m R  . When the agent observes  k   and  chooses  k a   for each task 
{1,..., } kK  , and the principal chooses t , the agent’s payoff is given by 
1
1
(, )
K
kk
k
ua t
K


  , where  : uA R  , and additive separability is assumed We also 
assume expected utility. 
A strategy for the agent is defined as the function 
K M    . We denote the set 
of strategies by  . Let 
                                                 
3  For every set   , the set of simple lotteries over    is  denoted  by  ()   . 
4 In order to focus on the adverse selection problem, we assume that the probabilistic alternative 
choices are verifiable by the court.   6
1
1
(,) [ ( , ) |,]
K
kk
k
vE u a t
K
 

     
denote the expected payoff induced by a strategy     in .
5 A strategy   is 
said to be a best response in   if 
(,) ( ,) vv      for  all . 
A social choice function is defined as  : f A   . Irrespective of  {1,..., } kK  , 
() k f A    is regarded as the desirable alternative choice for the k-th task when the 
agent observes  k  .
6 A social choice function  f  is said to be exactly implementable 
with respect to  K  if there exist a mechanism  () K   and a best response   in 
() K   such  that 
(1)     11 ( ( ,..., ))( ( ),..., ( )) 1 KK gf f      for  all  1 ()
K K
kk    . 
An infinite sequence of mechanisms  1 (() ) K K

   is said to virtually implement a social 
choice function  f   if for every  0   , there exists  K  such that for every  KK  , 
there is a best response    in  ( ) K   that  satisfies 
(2)    
{{ 1 } ( ) }
,() 1
kk kK a f
EK
K

 
        
 
. 
 
3. Necessary Condition for Virtual Implementation 
  
This section shows that the following condition is necessary for virtual 
implementation. The condition requires that truth-telling is better than any lying in the 
sense of permutation. 
 
Condition 1: For every  {2 } LI    and  every ( (1) ( ))
L L      , if 
() ( ) ll      for  all  {1… } lL    and  all  {1… }\{ } lL l   , 
then 
                                                 
5 Here, E      denotes the expectation operator given a condition   . 
6 Generally, a social choice function is defined as 
* :
K K f A  . In this paper, we restrict 
symmetric separable social choice functions, as in Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007). This restriction 
enables us to tract the model conveniently when we increase the number of tasks.   7
(3)    
11
((( ) ) ( ) ) ((( 1 ) ) ( ) )
LL
ll
uf l l uf l l   

    , 
where ( ) l   for  all  {1… } lL  , and  11 L  .
7 
8 
 
It might be difficult for the principal to detect any deviant if this deviant keeps the 
relative frequency of announcing each signal unchanged by lying according to any 
permutation over the private signals with the same probability across the tasks. 
Condition 1 implies that if an agent lies in this way, his payoff never improves. That is, 
for every permutation over the tasks  {1 } {1 } KK       , the agent’s payoff never 
improves by announcing  () k    instead of  k   for each task k  with the same 
probability across the tasks, i.e., 
() ()
11
(( ) ) (( ) )
KK
kk k k
kk
uf uf    

   . 
The following theorem shows that this condition is necessary for virtual 
implementation. 
 
Theorem 1: If there exists an infinite sequence of mechanisms  1 (() ) K K

   that  virtually 
implement  f , then Condition 1 holds. 
 
Proof: Suppose that Condition 1 does not hold, i.e., there exists  {2 } LI    and 
(( 1 ) () ) L      such that  ( ) ( ) ll      for all  {1… } lL    and all  {1… }\{ } lL l  , 
and 
11
((( ) ) ( ) ) ((( 1 ) ) ( ) )
LL
ll
uf l l uf l l   

    . Further, suppose that  1 (() ) K K

   
virtually implements  f . By the revelation principle,
9 we can assume without loss of 
generality that for every  K ,  ()(,, ) KM g t   is  a  direct mechanism where 
K M  ; 
                                                 
7  Condition 1 is our original condition. However, it is related with Theorem 1 of Fan(1956). We will 
discuss the detail about that in Section 5. 
8  For example, if  {, ,} HML  , the Condition 1 implies that 
(() ) (( ) ) (() ) (( ) ) (() ) (() ) ufH H ufM M ufLL ufM H ufLM ufH L        , 
(() ) (() ) (() ) (() ) ufH H ufLL ufLH ufH L      , 
and so on. 
9  See Myerson (1979) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1993, Chapter 7).   8
the  truthful strategy  ˆˆ () K    , defined by  11 ˆ( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) K K      for  all 
1 ()
K K
kk    , is a best response; and 
(4)    
{{ 1 } ( ) } ˆ lim ( ), ( ) 1
kk
K
kK a f
EK K
K



        
 
. 
Let  1
K
kk M M   ,  k M  ,  1 () K mm m M     , and  kk mM  . We denote 
11 1 ( ,..., ) ( ( ,..., ))
K
K kK k        , where  1 ( ,..., ) kK   . According to Appendix A, 
we can assume without loss of generality that for every K , ( ) ( , , ) KM g t    is 
symmetric in that for every mM  , every  1 ( ,..., )
K
K aa A  , and every permutation 
{1 } {1 } KK       , 
11 ( )( ,..., ) ( )( ,..., ) K K gm a a gm a a
   , 
where  1 ( ,..., ) K mmmM
  ,  () kk mm

  , and  () kk aa

  . 
For any  0   , let 
1
{{ 1 } }
() ( ) ()
KK K k
kk
kK
p for all
K

   


    
       

 
, 
which is the set of signal profiles such that the proportion of each signal   is 
approximated by the probability  ( ) p  . The law of large numbers implies that 
*
1 1 () ( )
lim { ( )} 1
KK
kk
K
k K k
p



  
   for all  0   . Therefore, there is an infinite sequence of 
positive real numbers  1 () KK 

  such  that  lim 0 K K 
   and 
(5)    
*
1 1 () ()
lim { ( )} 1
KK
kk K
K
k K k
p



  
  . 
Assume a sufficiently large K . From (4) and (5), it follows that there exists 
1 () ()
KK
kk K  

    such  that 
(6)     11 ( ,..., )( ( ),..., ( ))
K
KK gf f         is close to 1. 
We specify a strategy   as  follows. 
(i)  For every  {1 } lL    , the number of  {1 } kK     satisfying that  ( ) k l      
and  1 ( ,..., ) ( 1) kK l          is set equal to 
{1 } min { {1 } ( )} k lL kK l  
    

   . 
(ii)  For every  {1 } kK    , either  1 ( ,..., ) kK k        , or   9
() k l      and  1 ( ,..., ) ( 1) kK l         for  some  {1 } lL    . 
(iii)  For every  11 ( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) K K      , 
11 ( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) K K       . 
Note that there exists a permutation    on {1,..., } K  such  that 
11 ( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) K K
           , 
(7)     ()
11
(( ) ) (( ) )
KK
kk k k
kk
uf uf    

      , and 
(8)     11 ( ( ,...., ))( ( ,...., )) KK gf
           is approximated by 1, 
where  () kk

     . From (6), (7), and (8), it follows that 
1
1
ˆ (, ),() , ()
K
K
kk k k
k
Eu a K   

      1
1
(, ) ,() , ()
K
K
kk k k
k
Eu a K   

          . 
Since ( ) K    is symmetric, it follows that 
1
1
1 ˆ (, ) ,() , ()
K
K
kk k k
k
Eu a t K
K
  

      1
1
1
(, ) ,() , ()
K
K
kk k k
k
Eu a t K
K
  

           , 
which contradicts the fact that  ˆ    is a best response in  ( ) K  .             Q . E . D .  
 
  4. Linking Mechanisms 
 
This section shows that Condition 1 is also sufficient for virtual implementation. 
The proof of this statement is constructive, which shows not only this sufficiency but 
also that we do not need any side payment devices. Based on Jackson and Sonnenschein 
(2007), we define the linking mechanism 
** ()( ( , ) ) KM g t      as follows, which 
uses only constant side payments. We specify  ( , ): {0,..., } B BK K     such  that 
() B K



  , 
and for every  : {0,..., } bK  , 
(9)    
() ()
() ()
Bb
pp
KK 

 
 
    whenever  ( ) bK



  . 
Note that 
() B
K

  is approximated by  ( ) p    for a sufficiently large  K , i.e.,   10
(10)    
()
lim ( )
K
BK
p
K




  for  all  . 
Let  k M  for  all  {1,..., } kK  . We specify  M   as a subset of 
K   defined  by 
(11)         {1 } ( )
K
k M m k K m B for all            . 
For every  mM  , let 
    1 ( )( ( ),..., ( )) 1 K gm fm fm   and  () tm z   for  some  zR  . 
According to the linking mechanism, the agent has to announce each  
exactly  () B   times. This along with (10) implies that for a sufficiently large  K , the 
proportion of the tasks for which the agent announces   is almost the same as the 
probability  () p   of   occurring. The payment  z  is adjusted to satisfy the agent’s 
ex ante participation constraint. Since we do not incentivize the agent with side payment, 
the linking mechanism is free from the failure of the principal to extract the full surplus 
owing to the agent’s positive information rent.
10 
The following theorem shows that Condition 1 is sufficient for the linking 
mechanisms to virtually implement the social choice function. 
 
Theorem 2: Under Condition 1, 
*
1 (() ) K K

   virtually  implements  f . 
 
Proof: Suppose that there exists  0    such that for every  K , there exists  KK   
that satisfies that for every best response     in 
*() K  , 
(12)    
* {{ 1 } ( ) }
,( )
kk kK a f
EK
K

 
        
 
. 
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can choose an infinite sequence of positive real 
numbers  1 () KK 

  satisfying (5) and  lim 0 K K 
  . From (5) and (10), it follows that for 
every sufficiently large  K , every  1 () ()
KK
kk K  

  , and every   , 
                                                 
10   If the agent’s reservation utility is 0 , then the principal can set 
*
1
1
(, ),
K
kk
k
zE u a
K



  
    to extract full surplus, where     is a best response in 
*  . Note 
that our concept of full surplus extraction is in an ex ante sense as in Jackson and Sonnenschein 
(2007). Crèmer and McLean (1988) consider a stronger concept, interim full surplus extraction.   11
(13)    
{{ 1 } } k kK
K
       
  is approximated by 
(, ) B K
K

. 
Consider a best response   in 
*() K   satisfying that for every best response 
    in 
*() K  , 
(14)    
* 1 { {1 } ( ,..., ) }
,( )
kK k kK
EK
K
  

       
 
 
* 1 { {1 } ( ,..., ) }
,( )
kK k kK
EK
K
  

          
  
.. 
The left-hand side of (12) is rewritten as 
   
1
1
1 ()
{ {1 } ( ,..., ) }
()
KK
kk
K
kK k
k
k
kK
p
K 
  

  
   
 
 
 
*
1
1
1 () ()
{ {1 } ( ,..., ) }
()
KK
kk K
K
kK k
k
k
kK
p
K 
  

  
   
 
 
 
*
1
1
1 () ()
{ {1 } ( ,..., ) }
()
KK
kk K
K
kK k
k
k
kK
p
K 
  

  
   
 
 
. 
For every sufficiently large  K , the last term is close to zero; therefore, the left-hand 
side of (12) is approximated by 
   
*
1
1
1 () ()
{ {1 } ( ,..., ) }
()
KK
kk K
K
kK k
k
k
kK
p
K 
  

  
   
 
 
, 
which implies that there exists  1 ˆ () ()
KK
kk K  

   such  that 
(15)    
1 ˆˆ ˆ { {1 } ( ,..., ) } kK k kK
K
  

   

 
. 
A strategy     is said to be cyclic for  1 ()
K K
kk     if  there  exist 
{1 } SK     and a one-to-one function  {1,...,# } SS    such  that 2 SK   , 
s s      for  all sS   and  \{ } sSs  , and 
() 1 ( 1 ) ( ,..., ) lK l        for  all  {1,...,# } lS  , where  1 1 S   . 
If    is not cyclic for  1 ˆ ()
K
kk   , then the proportion of the tasks for which the agent 
announces incorrect private signals, i.e., 
1 ˆˆ ˆ { {1 } ( ,..., ) } kK k kK
K
        
, is less 
than or equal to   12
(16)    
{{ 1 } } ( ) ˆ k kK B
KK 
  

   
 
 
, 
which is close to zero because of (13). This contradicts (12). Hence,     must be cyclic 
for  1 ˆ ()
K
kk   , i.e., there exist  {1 } SK     and a one-to-one function  {1,...,# } SS    
such that  2 SK   , 
ˆˆ s s      for  all sS   and  \{ } sSs  , and 
() 1 ( 1 ) ˆˆ ˆ ( ,..., ) lK l        for  all  {1,...,# } lS  . 
We specify a strategy      by 
    1 ˆˆ ( ,..., ) ˆ s s K        for  all sS  , 
    11 ˆˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) s K sK         for  all sS   , and 
    11 ( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) K K        for  all  11 ˆ () ()
K K
kk kk     . 
Note that the expected number of the tasks for which the agent lies according to     is 
less than that according to   , i.e., 
* 1 { {1 } ( ,..., ) }
,( )
kK k kK
E K
K
  

       
     
* 1 { {1 } ( ,..., ) }
,( )
kK k kK
EK
K
  

          
 
. 
From Condition 1 and the fact that    is a best response in 
*() K  , it follows that     
is another best response in 
*() K  . This contradicts (14).             Q . E . D .  
 
Theorems 1 and 2 imply that Condition 1 is necessary and sufficient for virtual 
implementation. These theorems also imply that whenever a sufficiently large number 
of tasks are delegated to the agent, all that is required for virtual implementation is to 
check whether the linking mechanism functions or not. This implies that side payment 
devices are irrelevant to virtual implementation. 
The following proposition shows that we can replace Condition 1 with a more 
intuitive condition termed as supermodularity.
11 This along with Theorem 2 implies 
that supermodularity is sufficient for the linking mechanisms to virtually implement the 
                                                 
11 See Topkis (1979) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1993, Chapter 12) for supermodularity and its 
related concepts.   13
social choice function. 
 
Condition 2 (Supermodularity):    is an ordered set with  , and for every 
         ,  
(() ) (( ) ) uf uf         (( ) ) (( ) ) uf uf                , 
where  max{ }        and  min{ }        . 
 
Proposition 3: Condition 2 implies Condition 1. 
 
Proof: Consider any  {2 } LI    and ( (1) ( ))
L L       such  that 
() ( 1 ) ll      for  all  {1 1} lL    . 
From Condition 2, it follows that the right-hand side of (3) is rewritten as 
   
1
2
( ( (2)) (1)) ( ( (1)) ( )) ( ( ( 1)) ( ))
L
l
uf uf L uf l l    


       
1
2
( ( (1)) (1)) ( ( (2)) ( )) ( ( ( 1)) ( ))
L
l
uf uf L uf l l    


     
  ( ( (1)) (1)) ( ( (2)) ( )) ( ( (3)) (2)) uf uf L uf          
 
1
3
((( 1 ) ) ( ) )
L
l
uf l l 


  
 ( ( (1)) (1)) ( ( (2)) (2)) ( ( (3)) ( )) uf uf uf L       
 
1
3
((( 1 ) ) ( ) )
L
l
uf l l 


  
1
((( ) ) ( ) )
L
l
uf l l 

   , 
which implies Condition 1.                                        Q . E . D .  
 
  5. Exact Implementation 
 
This section investigates exact implementation that requires the value of a social 
choice function to be realized with certainty, irrespective of which private signal profile 
the agent observes. The following proposition shows that Condition 1 is necessary and 
sufficient for exact implementation irrespective of K ; therefore, the necessary and 
sufficient condition is the same for both virtual and exact implementation.   14
In contrast with virtual implementation, in order to exactly implement a nontrivial 
social choice function, we have to use inconstant side payment devices. If we confine 
our analysis to mechanisms with constant side payments, the exactly implementable 
social choice functions  f   are the only trivial ones such that 
    (() ,) (() ,) uf uf       for  all   and  all . 
Needless to say, linking mechanisms do not function effectively when we require, not 
only virtual, but also exact, implementation. 
 
Proposition 4: A social choice function  f  is exactly implementable with respect to 
K   if and only if Condition 1 holds.
12 
 
Proof: We can apply Theorem 1 proposed by Fan (1956) in the same manner as it was 
used in D’Aspremont and Gèrard-Varet (1979, Theorem 7). For the complete proof, see 
Appendix B. 
 
  Since Condition 1 does not depend on  K , the set of exactly implementable social 
choice functions is the same irrespective of the number of tasks. From Theorem 1 
presented in Fan (1956), it follows that a necessary and sufficient condition for exact 
implementation is that for every 
2 {0} R      , if    ()() 0  

 
 
  

  
for all  , then 
  (() ) (() ) ( ) 0 uf uf
 
    
  
   

 . 
Without loss of generality, we can focus only on the set of functions 
2 {0} R       
such that  (, ) 1

 

    for all  , i.e., the set of mixed strategies in the direct 
mechanism, where  ( , )      is the probability that the agent announces   given  that 
he observes   . The above condition is equivalent to the condition that for every mixed 
strategy    in the direct mechanism, if the frequencies of announcing private signals 
                                                 
12 The sufficiency part of Proposition 4 and the definition of virtual implementation imply that the 
Condition 1 is a sufficient condition for virtual implementation with side payments. Note that 
Theorem 2 states that the Condition 1 is a sufficient condition for virtual implementation without 
side payments.   15
are the same as the probabilities of these signals being observed, i.e., 
    (| ) ( ,) ( ) () pp p

     

     for  all , 
the ex ante expected payoff with no side payments induced by the dishonest mixed 
strategy is not greater than that induced by the honest strategy, i.e., 
    ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) uf p uf p
 
     
  
    

 . 
Based on the law of large numbers, this inequality implies that the requirement of 
truth-telling being a best response is almost satisfied when the number of the tasks  K  
is sufficiently large. Hence, the functioning of the message space restriction in the 
linking mechanism as a whole incentive scheme parallels that of the incentive payment 
scheme in the direct mechanism for each task. 
 
6. Multiple Agents 
 
This section generalizes the previous results to a case in which multiple  n agents 
who observe their respective private signals are in conflict with each other over their 
own interests. 
 
6.1. The Model 
 
The following multiple agent model is a direct extension of the single agent model 
in Section 2. Each agent  {1,..., } in    chooses a profile of K  alternatives 
[] , 1 [] , 1 [] , ( ,..., )
K
ii K k i k aa A   , where  [] , ik A  denotes the finite set of agent  ' is  alternatives 
for the k-th task, and  [] , [] , ik ik aA  . Agent  i observes a profile of  K  private signals 
[] , 1 [] , 1 [] , ( ,..., )
K
ii K k i k     , where  [] , ik   denotes the finite set of agent  ' is  private 
signals for the k-th task, and  [] , [] , ik ik   . Assume that  [] , [] ik i A A   and  [] , [] ik i    
for all  {1,..., } kK   and  all  {1,..., } in  . Let  [] ii I     ,  1[ ]
n
ii AA   ,  1[ ]
n
ii    , 
[1], [ ], ( ,..., ) kk n k aa a A  ,  [1] [ ] ( ,..., ) n     , and  [1], [ ], ( ,..., ) kk n k    . 
A mechanism is defined as  ()( , ( , ) ) KM g t    , where  1[ ]
n
ii M M   ,  [] i M  is   16
the finite set of messages for agent  i,  [] 1 ()
n
ii tt   , and  [] i tM R  . When the agents 
observe  1 ()
K K
kk     and choose  1 ()
K K
kk aA    and the principal chooses  [] 1 ()
n
ii tt   , 
agent  is    payoff is given by  [] []
1
1
(, )
K
ikk i
k
ua t
K


  , where  []: i uA R  . 
A strategy for agent  i is defined as  [] [] []
K
ii i M    . Let  [] i   denote the set of 
strategies for agent  i. Let  []
1
n
i
i
    and  [] 1 ()
K
ii   . Let 
[] [] []
1
1
(,) [ ( , ) |,]
K
ii k k i
k
vE u a t
K
 

     
denote the expected payoff for agent  i induced by a strategy profile    in . A 
strategy profile     is said to be a Nash equilibrium in   if for every  {1,..., } in   
and every  [] [] ii   , 
[] [] [] [] (,) ( , ,) ii i i vv      . 
A social choice function  f  is said to be exactly implementable with respect to  K  in 
terms of Nash equilibrium if there exists a mechanism  ( ) K   and a Nash equilibrium 
  in  ( ) K   such  that 
11 ( ( ,..., ))( ( ),..., ( )) 1 KK gf f      for  all  1 ()
K K
kk    . 
In this section, we require only the weak sense of implementation, i.e., do not 
require the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, we weaken the Nash 
equilibrium concept as follows. For each  0   , a strategy profile    is said to be 
a   Nash equilibrium in  ( ) K    if for every  {1,..., } in   and  every  [] [] ii   , 
[] [] [] [] (,) ( , ,) ii i i vv        . 
By using this weakened concept, we define virtual implementation for the multiple 
agent case as follows. An infinite sequence of mechanisms  1 (() ) K K

   is said to 
virtually implement a social choice function  f  if for every  0    and every  0   , 
there exists  K  such that for every  KK  , there is a   Nash equilibrium    in 
() K   satisfying   17
{{ 1 } ( ) }
,() 1
kk kK a f
EK
K

 
        
 
.
13 
Let 
[] []
[] [] () ( )
ii
ii pp

 
 
  . As a natural extension of Section 4, we define the 
linking mechanism 
*()( ( , ) ) KM g t     as follows. We specify 
[] [] [] (, ): {0,..., } ii i B BK K     such  that 
[] []
[] (, )
ii
ii B KK



  , and for every 
[] [] : {0,..., } ii bK  , 
[] [] [] []
[] [] [] []
[] [] [] []
() ()
() ()
ii ii
ii ii
ii ii
Bb
pp
KK 


 
    if 
[] []
[] [] ()
ii
ii bK



  . 
For every  {1,..., } in  , let 
[] , [] ik i M   for  all  {1,..., } kK  , 
    [] [] , 1 [] [] , [] , [] [] [] () { 1 } ( )
KK
ii k k i i k i k i i i i M m k K m B for all                , 
[] , [] , ik ik mM  , and  [1], [ ], ( ,..., ) kk n k mm m  . 
For every  mM  , let 
1 ( )( ( ),..., ( )) 1 K gm fm fm   and  []() 0 i tm   for  all  {1,..., } in  . 
 
6.2 Results 
  
The following Condition is a direct extension of Condition 1, where each agent is 
required to satisfy slightly modified versions of the inequalities (3) in which the payoff 
(() ) uf     is replaced with the conditional expected value  [] [] [] (() ) ii i Euf        . 
 
Condition 3: For every  {1,..., } in  , every {2 } LI    , and every 
[] [] [] (( 1 ) ( ) )
L
iii L      , if 
[] [] () ( ) ii ll      for  all  {1… } lL    and  {1… }\{ } lL l   , 
                                                 
13  In the single agent model, weak implementation secures the same utility level of the agent. In the 
multi-agent model, our weaker notion of virtual implementation with   -Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
does not secure the same utility level for agents.   18
then 
[] [] [] [] [] [] []
1
( ( () , ) () , ) ()
L
ii i i i i i
l
Euf l l l    

   
[] [] [] [] [] [] []
1
(( ( 1 ) , ) ( ) , ) ( )
L
ii i i i i i
l
Euf l l l     

     . 
 
  The following condition is also a direct extension of Condition 2, where each agent 
is required to satisfy slightly modified version of supermodularity in which the payoff 
(() ) uf     is replaced with the conditional expected value  [] [] [] (() ) ii i Euf        . 
 
Condition 4 (Supermodularity): For every  {1,..., } in  ,  [] i   is an ordered set with 
, and for every  [] [] [] [] [] iiii i        , 
    [] [] [] [] [] [] [] (( , ) , ) ii i i i i i Euf             
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] (( , ) , ) i i iiiii Euf            
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] (( , ) , ) i i ii i ii i ii Euf                    
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] (( , ) , ) i i ii i ii i ii Euf                     . 
 
  In the same way as in the previous sections, we can show the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 5: Suppose that the agents’ private signals for each task are independent of 
each other, i.e.,  [] []
1
() ( )
n
ii
i
pp  

  for  all  . Then, the following four properties 
hold. 
Property 1:  If there exists an infinite sequence of mechanisms  1 (() ) K K

   that 
virtually implement a social choice function  f , then Condition 3 holds. 
Property 2:  Under Condition 3, 
*
1 (() ) K K

   virtually  implements  f . 
Property 3:  Condition 4 implies Condition 3. 
Property 4:  A social choice function  f   is exactly implementable with respect to  K    19
if and only if Condition 3 holds. 
 
  Properties 3 and 4 are easy to prove because we can directly apply the proofs of 
Propositions 3 and 4. Note that the definition of virtual implementation in this section is 
different from that in the single agent case presented in Section 2. This is because we do 
not require the agents to play their best responses in the exact sense. However, even if 
we replace the original definition in Section 2 with that provided in this section, we can 
prove Property 1, i.e., the necessity of Condition 3 for virtual implementation, in exactly 
the same manner as in the proof of Theorem 1. Based on this, we can extend the 
necessity result obtained in the single agent case to Property 1 for the multiple agent 
case by simply applying the same logic as that used in the former case. 
  We need to provide detailed explanations in order to prove Property 2. Let us 
assume any positive real number  0    sufficiently close to zero and consider a 
sufficiently large  K . Let  [] [] (, ) ii K     denote the set of agent  is   strategies  [] i   
such that the expected value of the proportion of the tasks for which the agent 
announces incorrect private signals is less than   , i.e., 
[] , [] , *
[]
{{ 1 } }
,( )
ik ik
i
kK m
EK
K

 
    
  

 
. 
As in Theorem 2, we can observe that  [] [] (, ) ii K     is nonempty for a sufficiently 
large  K . Define 
[](, ) i K  
[] [] [] []
*
[] [] (,)
1
1
max max ( , ) , ( )
ii i i
K
ikk i K
k
Ev at K
K   
  

  
          
[] []
*
[] [] (,)
1
1
max ( , ) ( ),
ii
K
ikk i K
k
Eu at K
K   


 
       . 
Note that  [](, ) i K    approximates the maximum of agent  ' is  gain from deviation. 
Clearly, there exists a  [] {1,..., } max ( , ) i in K  
 Nash equilibrium in 
*() K  . As in the proof of 
Theorem 2, we can observe that there exists a best response for agent  i such that the 
expected value of the proportion of the tasks for which the agent announces incorrect   20
private signals is close to zero.
14  This implies that we can choose a strategy for agent  i 
in  [](, ) i K    that is nearly a best response and, therefore, we can choose  [](, ) i K    
close to zero. In fact, by choosing   as close to zero and then choosing a sufficiently 
large  K , we can obtain  [](, ) i K    as close to zero as possible. Thus, we have proved 
Property 2. 
 
6.3. Remarks 
 
From Property 4, it follows as in Appendix B that we can replace Condition 3 with 
the condition that for every  {1,..., } in  , there exists  [] [] : ii rR    such that for every 
[] [] ii    and  every  [] [] ii    , 
[] [] [] [] [] (() ) ( ) ii i ii Euf r       [] [] [] [] [] [] [] (( , ) ) ( ) ii i i i ii Euf r           . 
By assuming  [] [] () 0 ii r    for all  {1,..., } in  , we can verify that for Condition 3, it is 
sufficient that for every  {1,..., } in  , every  [] [] ii   , and every  [] [] ii    , 
[] [] [] (() ) ii i Euf        [] [] [] [] [] (( , ) ) ii i i i Euf           . 
This condition is the same as the ex ante efficiency that was introduced by Jackson and 
Sonnenschein (2007) as the sufficient condition for implementation. In contrast with the 
present paper, Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) assumed private values and showed 
full implementation in that for a sufficiently large  K , every Nash equilibrium in the 
linking mechanism virtually induces the value of the ex ante efficient social choice 
function. 
  In Theorem 5, we have supposed that the agents’ private signals are independent of 
each other. Even in the case of correlated private signals across all the agents, we can 
prove that Properties 1, 2, 3, and the sufficient part of Property 4. However, if the 
agents’ signals are correlated to each other, the class of exactly implementable social 
choice functions is wider than the class of social choice functions that are virtually 
                                                 
14 This does not imply that the expected value of the proportion of the tasks for which the agent 
announces incorrect private signals is less than  . This is why we cannot use the exact Nash 
equilibrium in place of    Nash equilibrium in the case of multiple agents.   21
implementable by linking mechanisms. In fact, any social choice function is exactly 
implementable whenever the probability distribution of the other agents’ signal profile 
conditional on each agent’s private signal varies across her signals, i.e., 
    [] [] [] [] (| ) (| ) ii ii pp      for  all  [] [] ii    and  all  [] [] [] \{ } iii     , 
where 
[] []
[] [] []
[] []
()
(| )
(, )
ii
ii i
ii
p
p
p



 



 

 
. Needless to say, this sufficient condition is 
extremely weak. See Crèmer and McLean (1985, 1988), Matsushima (1990, 2007), 
Aoyagi (1998), Chung (1999), and others. In this case, the incentive wage scheme for 
each agent depends on the other agents’ announcements as well as on his own 
announcement. This implies that whether each agent should be punished or rewarded is 
crucially dependent on the whistle-blowing of the other agents. Thus, even though the 
linking mechanism is a potentially powerful tool to incentivize agents in the case of 
correlated private signals, the drawback of this mechanism as compared with incentive 
wage schemes is that whistle-blowing is never effective without side payments. 
 
6.4. Macro Shock 
  
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the private signals were drawn 
independently across all the tasks. However, by just adding a prior message stage in a 
simple way, the linking mechanism does function effectively even if the private signals 
are correlated across all the tasks.
15 
Consider a situation in which there exist three or more agents. Suppose that there 
exists a macro shock     on which the probability distribution of  k    for each task 
{1,..., } hK    and the social choice function are dependent. We denote  () (|) pp    , 
[] [] [] [] () (| ) ii ii pp    , and  ( ) ( , ) ff    . Here, we assume that   is a finite set, 
and for every  {1,..., } in  , every   , and every  \{ }    , 
(17)     [] [] (| ) (| ) ii pp    . 
                                                 
15 This section handles with a special case of correlation, i.e., the signals are correlated through an 
unobservable macro shock. We figure out how the linking mechanism works in this special case 
here.     22
In order to be able to apply the appropriate linking mechanism, the principal needs to 
know the true macro shock  . However, the principal and the agents both cannot 
observe this shock. 
As we have already known, with a sufficiently large  K , it is almost certain, based 
on the law of large numbers, that the realized proportion of the tasks for which an agent 
observes each private signal is almost the same as the probability of his observing this 
signal for a single task. This along with (17) implies that almost certainly each agent can 
infer the macro shock correctly from the observed private signals for all the tasks. 
With three or more agents, the principal can incentivize the agents to tell of what 
they know about the macro shock to the best of their abilities as follows. The principal 
requires each agent to announce about the macro shock. If more than a half of the agents 
announce the same macro shock     , the principal will apply the linking mechanism 
associated with  ( ) ( | ) pp     and  ( ) ( , ) ff     . If there is no such   , the 
principal will apply some fixed mechanism. Hence, announcing about the macro shock 
honestly is nearly a best response for each agent if the other agents announce honestly, 
because his announcement does not much influence which mechanism the principal will 
apply. This implies that truth-telling about the macro shock is described as an 
epsilon-Nash equilibrium strategy. 
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Appendix A 
 
We will show that in the proof of Theorem 1, we can assume without loss of 
generality that  () K   is symmetric. Suppose that  () K   is not symmetric. For each 
permutation    on {1,..., } K , we define  g
  and t
   in ways that for each  mM  , 
11 ( )( ,..., ) ( )( ,..., )  KK gm a a g ma a
     for  all  1 ()
K K
kk aA   , and 
()( )   tm t m
  . 
Let ( , , ) M gt
   . We define 
   by  1 ( ,..., ) K m
    , where we denote 
1 ( ,..., ) K m    . Note that for every     and  every  1 ()
K K
kk    , 
1
1
1
(, ) , , ()
K
K
kk k k
k
Eu at
K
  

     1
1
1
(, ) , , ( )
K
K
kk k k
k
Eu at
K
    

         . 
Since the truthful strategy  ˆ    is a best response in   and  ˆˆ
    , it follows from (4) 
that  ˆ    is a best response in 
  , and 
{{ 1 } ( ) } ˆ lim , 1
kk
K
kK a f
E
K
 


        
 
. 
We define a symmetric mechanism  (, , ) M gt   by 
1
gg
K



   and 
1
tt
K



  , 
where   denotes the set of permutations on  {1,..., } K . Clearly,  ˆ   is a best response 
in  , and   25
{{ 1 } ( ) } ˆ lim , 1
kk
K
kK a f
E
K



        
 
. 
Hence, we can assume without loss of generality that  ( ) K   is  symmetric. 
 
Appendix B 
 
We show the complete proof of Proposition 4. Choose  K   arbitrarily. Suppose that 
f  is exactly implementable with respect to K , i.e., there exist  () K   and a best 
response  
 in  ( ) K   such  that 
(B-1)   11 ( ( ,..., ))( ( ),..., ( )) 1 KK gf f    
   for  all 
K K   . 
Consider any K  such that  Ky K z     for some positive integer  y  and some 
integer {0,..., 1} zK  . By using  ( ) K   in a set of  y  for the first  yK  tasks, we 
can construct a mechanism  ( ) K   such that there exists a best response that induces 
the values of  f  for the first  yK  tasks. This implies that there exists an infinite 
sequence of mechanisms that virtually implements  f . This along with Theorem 1 
implies that Condition 1 is necessary for exact implementation. 
Next, we will prove the sufficiency. We merely need to show that Condition 1 is 
sufficient in the case of  1 K  , because if this is true, we can exactly implement the 
social choice function irrespective of  K  by simply using  (1)   in a set of  K  for all 
tasks. Thus, it is sufficient to verify whether or not there exists a side payment function 
: rR   such  that 
(() ) () (() ) () uf r uf r          for  all   and  all   . 
Using Theorem 1 proposed by Fan (1956) as it is used in D’Aspremont and 
Gèrard-Varet (1979, Theorem 7), we can show that a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the existence of such an  r   is that for every 
2 {0} R      , if 
(B-2)     ()() 0  

 
 
   

  for  all  , 
then 
(B-3)     (() ) (() ) ( ) 0 uf uf
 
    
  
   

 .   26
For every  {2 … } LI , an L-tuple of private signals  ( (1) … ( ))
L L      is said to 
be a cycle if  (( ) ( 1 ) ) 0 ll      and  () ( ) ll 
   for all  {1 … } lL    and all 
  {1 … } \ { } lL l
  . 
Suppose Condition 1 that for every  {2 } LI     and every (( 1 ) () ) L     , if 
() ( ) ll       for  all  {1 … } lL    and  all 
  {1 … } \ { } lL l
  , then 
(B-4)  
11
((( ) ) ( ) ) ((( 1 ) ) ( ) )
LL
ll
uf l l uf l l   

    . 
Evidently, we can choose 
2 (1) {0} R       , (1)  , and  (2) \{ (1)}     
satisfying (B-2) and  (( 1 ) ( 2 ) ) 0    . If  (( 2 ) ( 1 ) ) 0      holds, then (( 1 ) ( 2 ) )     
is a cycle. If  (( 2 ) ( 1 ) ) 0    , it follows from (B-2) that we can choose a private 
signal  (3) \{ (1) (2)}      such  that  (( 2 ) ( 3 ) ) 0     . 
Choose a positive integer  l   arbitrarily. Suppose that  ( (1) ..., ( 1)) l      satisfies 
() () ll       for  all  {1 … 1} ll    and  {1 … 1} \ { } ll l     , 
(() ( 1 ) ) 0 ll       for  all  {1 … 2} ll   , and 
(() () ) 0 ll       for  all 
  {2 … 2} ll
   and  {1 … 1} ll    . 
If there exists 
  {1 … 2} ll
   such  that  (( 1 ) () ) 0 ll      , then 
( ( ) ..., ( 1)) ll      is a cycle. If there exists no such  l, it follows from (B-2) that we 
can choose a private signal  ( ) \{ (1) ..., ( 1)} ll     such  that 
(( 1 ) ( ) ) 0 ll    . 
Since  I     is finite, by continuing the above step, we can determine 
{2,..., } lI   and  {1,...., 1} ll    such that ( ( ) ..., ( )) ll      is a cycle. By replacing  l 
and  l  with 1 and L, respectively, we denote this cycle by  (1) ( (1) … ( )) CL     . 
Let 
{1 … } (1) min ( ( ) ( 1))
lL ll   
   . Specify 
2 (1) : R    such  that 
(1)( ( ) ( 1)) (1) ll       for  all  {1,..., } lL  , 
and for every 
2 ()     , if there exists no  {1,..., } lL   such  that 
() ( ( ) , ( 1 ) ) ll       , then  (1)( ) 0      . From (B-4), it follows that 
 
2 (,)
(() ) (() ) ( 1 ) (, ) 0 uf uf

   
 
     .   27
We define 
2 (2) R     by  (2) (1) (1)     . From (B-2) and the definition 
of  (1)  , it follows that 
    (2)( ) 0      for  all   and  all , and 
  (2)( ) (2)( ) 0

   
 
   

  for  all  . 
If  (2)( ) 0      for all  and all  \{ }     , the inequality (B-3) holds for 
(2)    , i.e., 
  ( ( )) ( ( ))( 2 ) ( )0 uf uf
 
    
  
   

 . 
If (2)( ) 0      for some  and some  \{ }     , we can construct a cycle 
(2) C  and  (3)    as we did in  (1) C  and  (2)  . 
By continuing the above step, we can determine a positive integer q , 
2 () : { 0 } qR       for  each  {1,..., 1} qq   , and 
2 () : { 0 } qR      such  that 
 
\{ }
(() ) (() ) () ( ) 0 uf uf q
 
    
 
   

 , 
for every  {1,..., 1} qq  , 
 
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   . 
These imply (B-3). Thus, we have proved Proposition 4. 
 
 
 
 